Transcript 0:00 Welcome to What's Your Source?, the vodcast that you can't spell without what? You call us with a question about something you're seeing in your feed, and we try our best to answer it. 0:09 That said, please, no more calls about the Kelly Clarkson bird. Big mistake. Huge. [phone rings] Caller? Hey, Dave. Um, I was curious on what has been happening to the Russian bot spam accounts. 0:24 I've been seeing a lot of posts about how data centers in Russia are being destroyed by Ukrainian attacks, and that seems to have alleviated a little bit of a bot problem, especially on Twitter. 0:35 I was curious as to what your insight is on that. Ah, debunking Russian Twitter bots. An easy one. But first, as always, we are presented by Beehiiv, the number one tool for managing your podcast. 0:46 They have this thing called dynamic ad insertion, where you choose where ad breaks go, how many ads play in a break, and even which advertising categories can run or not run when using programmatic ads. 0:57 Visit beehiiv.com/podcast-ads to learn more and use the code DAVE30 for 30% off. Beehiiv. There's no I in team, but for some reason, there's two in Beehiiv. So did Ukraine solve the Russian bot problem? 1:11 If they did, can they also solve the problem of my three-year-old daughter's math homework? Because I'm stumped. Okay, roll credits. 1:17 [upbeat music] Welcome back. Our viewer wants to know if Ukraine's data center strikes affected Russia's bot army. 1:34 So here's what happened. Ukraine has been striking Yandex data centers in Russia. Yandex is huge in the tech world of Russia. 1:41 They developed the region's leading generative AI model, YandexGPT, and are known as the Google of Russia. Yes, Yandex is Russian Google, or as they say in Russia, A Google. Okay. It's the same. 1:55 Immediately after the strikes, Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, said this. It suddenly became a little easier to breathe on many social media platforms, and there was less hate, 2:08 less division, and fewer provocations. He added, "Unfortunately, there was nothing to be done about the Minions memes. They're just too resilient, and also funny." 2:18 [laughs] Have you seen the one with the, with the one eye? Zelenskyy's post got a lot of attention in America and Europe. 2:25 Prominent election activists Occupy Democrats posted, "Zelenskyy might have just saved our democracy. The genius is brilliantly bombing Russian data centers linked to fake news pro-MAGA bot farms in Moscow. 2:37 Without them, Putin's midterm influence will accidentally fall from a 30th-floor window." And they weren't alone. 2:43 The liberal side of the internet was optimistic, and a lot of people, including politicians, activists, and even Polymarket were posting about it. But as we often ask on this podcast, was this happening? 2:54 And also, are you getting enough protein, bro? [upbeat music] Tackling the first question gets pretty technical. Did someone say technical? Whoa, my tech guru intern. Yes, it is I, Aleksei Not-a-Bot. 3:09 Such an interesting, beautiful last name. Yes, is Irish. Okay, Aleksei. I'm a bit confused. Because you're old and tired, like old, tired babushka? No, I was thinking more because it's a complicated story. 3:23 No, story is simple. You are wrong, like old, tired, wrong babushka. Okay. Okay. People think bot traffic went down because users online were sharing information from website called Cloudflare. Okay, okay. 3:38 Cloudflare monitors internet traffic. Okay. And after strikes, Cloudflare did show drop in Yandex traffic. How do you know so much about the internet, Aleksei Not-a-Bot? I am just regular human Gen Z, Dave. 3:56 I like internet, dogs on skateboards, and Benson Boone and his magical musical flipping. You're so cool. Like Benson. Tubular, David. So the Ukrainian strikes did cause a reduction or interruption of bot traffic? 4:12 As we say in Ireland, da and nyet. A drop in overall traffic only confirms that the network went down. It doesn't reveal whether malicious or evasive bots were disrupted. Got it. 4:26 So yes, the strikes turned off bots, but not necessarily the kind of bots these posts are thinking of. They also turned off a lot of the other internet, but there's no proof the Russian bots actually stopped posting. 4:37 Nyet. In fact, Cloudflare found that while there was some bot interruption, bot operators were able to quickly migrate their systems to alternative cloud operators and continue running undeterred. 4:51 Oh my God, so these Russian bots could be anywhere. The cloud, Belarus. Yes. In those two places only. You can stop looking for bots now. Okay. 5:03 But if they migrated to the cloud, why were people saying there was less bot activity? Honestly, David, vibes. 5:11 Because Cloudflare could not determine if this disruption in bot activity had any effect on social media campaigns specifically. The bots just kept spreading misinformation anyway? Is possible. 5:23 Which remind me, time to post selfie and then tag your mother and send her a fabricated story about James Tallarico. Wait a minute, Aleksei Not-a-Bot. There's something you're not telling me. 5:37 [upbeat music] Is it your birthday today? You got me, David. 5:55 There's cake in the bug zone, you big goof. I'll see you down there. Uh, is the door password still your Social Security number? Sure is. 6:05 On the extremely off chance that my human, very Irish intern left something out, let's chat with a real expert, associate research professor at Georgetown University's McCourt School of Public Policy, Renee DiResta. 6:17 Hi, I'm Renee DiResta. I'm an associate research professor at Georgetown University's McCourt School of Public Policy. So I study, uh, influence and propaganda. 6:25 I say rumors and disinformation a little bit more than misinformation. I think that's a more accurate description of what's happening. 6:31 Uh, for a long time now, probably just a little over, um, almost 12 years, I've looked at foreign interference and ways in which state actors and, uh, incentivized political actors manipulate online discourse using social media and the tools that are available to all of us. 6:47 So here's how you take things that are used in very normal ways and how state actors can use them for manipulation. How has that evolved since... 6:54 I mean, 2016 is an easy marker, but really in the last decade, how much has that evolved, uh, for better or worse? [laughs] So they evolve the, the techniques according to what technology is available, right? 7:05 So you should think about it as a little bit like a playing field. Whenever you have certain things at your disposal, you're gonna see adversarial actors go and use them. 7:12 So generative AI gets talked about quite a lot now. Starting in around 2018 or so, we started to see, um, we started to see foreign influence actors using, for example, AI-generated profile pictures. 7:24 I don't know if people remember this still, but there used to be these little PSAs we would put out about, oh, you have to look at the teeth, and the ears, and the hair would blend into the, the clothes. 7:32 None of those tells work anymore, right? 7:33 They've moved on to better models, but that same idea of using technology to manipulate the discourse, um, by incorporating it in ways that make your operations, uh, cheaper, faster, larger, more effective. 7:46 That's what we see. So I think the answer to your question is basically, um, you know, it, it really... The premise of, um, running a manipulation campaign, you will still see them pretend to be something they're not. 7:58 They just do it in ways that the technology allows them to, uh, leverage. AI has absolutely, uh, been a massive tool in the technology around this. So what are the other... 8:08 W- What, what else is happening outside of just profile photos or something that they- they're able to use AI to maybe spread something faster? Oh, yeah. We all anticipated that we would see them use AI. 8:17 As text generation became possible around 2020, I started writing about ways that they would use it to, uh, obscure the fact that for a long time they were just plagiarizing, right? 8:26 And they would get caught because they plagiarized. 8:28 There was a very interesting, uh, incident where a Russian troll working for military intelligence for the GRU sent a news outlet an article about Syria, and that editor went and Googled it and realized that, hey, this is plagiarized, and then went and emailed the other person who the, the, uh, the troll had plagiarized from, only to discover that person was a troll, too. 8:48 That person also didn't exist, right? So you had these complicated networks where they were recycling content because otherwise they had to have a human troll actually sit there and write it. 8:57 So generative AI lets them do that all at once, right? You can generate it. It'll be unique. It'll be different. You won't hit that plagiarization, um, kind of tell. 9:07 The other thing is that oftentimes you would see Russian trolls targeting America, for example, maybe targeting, um, the Black community, would use language that was just not quite right, and that would be, again, a little bit of a red flag. 9:19 And you would see, um, activists, particularly Black women in the community, saying, like, you know, "Who are you?" They used the phrase, "Your slip is showing," at the time, right? 9:26 And so this idea that, um, the way that generative text works, you can solve that problem. What we're seeing now is agents, right? 9:36 So much more autonomous systems where you can delegate tasks to your Claude Code Terminal, and it will run them for you. So we're starting to see the back office get automated. 9:47 So the things where you used to have to hire people to, you know, to just run your operation, now increasingly, the operation is run by AI also. 9:55 Now, my understanding, a- a- and, again, like almost rudimentary in 2016, 2017, was the people that were running this were, like, Russian teens in their basements. Uh, uh- Yeah... is that correct? Like, is... 10:05 And have they been replaced by these- [laughs]... these sort of agents? [laughs] You know, you can never, you can never fully, I think, um... L- We haven't hit the point yet where you can fully replace people. 10:14 There are still people involved. 10:16 Um, but some of the earliest, earliest operations that I saw, uh, back over a decade now, were actually, um, it was a Russian social network, Vkontakte, and what you would see is the Internet Research Agency official employed trolls, right? 10:30 People under the pay of Yevgeny Prigozhin were actually dropping things that they wanted to go viral into these VK group chats, basically these, these groups where these teenagers would actually pick them up and make them go viral. 10:45 And they would kind of compensate them with, like, you know, extra fake accounts or, like, a little bit of money. But it was almost more of a game, right? Can you make this thing trend? 10:53 And they really started by, uh, targeting the conversation about Ukraine. This was right ahead of the invasion of Crimea, right? 10:58 So, uh, yeah, so absolutely you saw some maybe paid 25-year-olds, you know, [laughs] and then your, uh... And then the, the sort of actual work farmed out to these teenagers who were just good at getting stuff to trend. 11:10 So they haven't all been kicked out of, out of their parents' basement, so to speak. No, I don't think so. Some of them are still- Well, you know, there was obviously... 11:16 So, um, there was a very interesting moment where as part of the conflict over the war in Ukraine, Yevgeny Prigozhin, who was sort of known as Putin's chef, this sort of all-around guy, he'd literally been a, a hotdog vendor at one point, um, spent some time in jail, you know. 11:32 [laughs] A very, very colorful background. Uh, he went, and he also ran a paramilitary organization called the Wagner Group, and that operates, um, in theater, in Africa in particular, but in a lot of places. 11:44 And, um, he actually sort of challenged Putin during this conflict, saying, you know, uh, the official generals versus the Wagner Group entities, they came into conflict. 11:53 And, um, he wound up- You know, in a plane that exploded, right? [laughs] So there was a leadership change in the [laughs] Yeah. [laughs] There was a lead- leadership change. Uh-huh. 12:02 And so now instead of the Internet Research Agency, you have much more, um... Again, they, they keep sort of a nominal quasi independence. Um, so did the Internet Research Agency for a long time. 12:14 Uh, you know, Prigozhin denied that it even really existed. It was a figment of the Americans' imagination. Uh, but then he actually came to be quite proud of it, took credit for it. 12:22 I'll get off this in a moment, but I'm, I'm, I'm really stuck on the idea of being, like, gainfully employed. And this, like, do they have W-2 forms? Do you know what I mean? Like, is it like- Do you know... 12:29 this is my job? Yes. I mean, they do. Uh, you know, they have what we call in tech standups, right? Where you all kind of... You, you have this in editorial content also, right? 12:38 You go around the room, and everybody talks about what they're working on, what they've learned, what they might be having a problem with or a blocker with. 12:43 And there were some FBI indictments of actually the accountants and some of the, uh, the business operations entities. 12:50 So there's a group called Concord Group Limited that served as a kind of umbrella over a lot of these different operations that Prigozhin ran, including media properties. 12:58 And there, in the indictments, um, from the DOJ, you do see them talking about, uh, at morning standup, you know, what kind of, uh, images and memes work best for the LGBTQ community, right? 13:11 And so they're actually just out there almost like an editorial meeting. Huh. Okay. Uh, okay, I wanna get to the meat of it. 13:17 So we had, like, at least two calls, uh, maybe more at this point, uh, about this drone strike in, in Russia, and I, I think a lot of it, uh, s- came from... 13:26 There's, there's at least one page we identified that had a lot of, uh, reach. It's the Occupy Democrats Facebook page. So I'll, I'll read you the, the caption they had. Um, "Zelensky might have just saved our democracy. 13:36 The genius is brilliantly, brilliantly bombing Russia data centers linked to fake news, pro-MAGA bot farms in Moscow. Without them, Putin's midterm influence will accidentally fall from a 30th floor window." 13:47 Um, so is there [laughs]... Was there truth to this? Unravel this for me. Well, people do fall out of windows in Russia at a remarkably different rate. That, that part is true. Yes, we know that. [laughs] Yes. Yeah. 13:56 [laughs] So what happened is there were Ukrainian drone strikes on several Russian data centers, particularly operated by Yandex, right, which people sometimes call the Russian Google. 14:06 Um, there was a real chart that was put out by Cloudflare, uh, which sort of monitors, uh, web traffic, right? 14:13 And that chart showed a 99% drop in what Cloudflare calls bot traffic, and people assumed that that meant Russian propaganda bots. 14:22 And because of what we call sometimes the vibes, you know, they were like, "Oh, my social media feed just feels nicer today. There's not as many MAGA people yelling at me." 14:30 You saw some politicians from Europe saying there's not as many AFD people out here, right? 14:33 So the sense that it really spread among the left, this idea that various, um, right-wing communities had been silenced all of a sudden, which meant that commensurate with the Yandex, um, data centers going down, that those accounts must have just been Russian trolls. 14:49 But the bots, that term also refers to crawlers, right? So what a crawler is, is, um... You know, Google has one. It's called the Google Bot. It just goes out, and it indexes the internet, right? 14:59 And it, and it, um, identifies new web pages, new articles, all this sort of stuff. They're constantly crawling, uh, to try to figure out what to serve you. 15:07 So Yandex, being the Russian Google, also has a whole lot of search engine crawlers. 15:12 So the chart is showing the sudden, um, precipitous decline of the search engine crawlers, which is actually exactly what you would expect. Uh, and then Cloudflare actually did go out and investigate. 15:22 They put out a report, uh, maybe Thursday or Friday of last week saying that they found no evidence of a widespread shutdown in social media manipulation. 15:31 Malicious traffic migrated, but it didn't decline, and when they said malicious traffic, they were actually primarily talking about the sorts of, um, you know, more hacker-style entities that are going out and trying to find vulnerabilities. 15:43 In my sort of Marvel broken brain, it's very sci... Like, oh, they just moved to another. They just moved Vision to another- Well, this is... You know, think about [laughs] Your internet goes down. 15:52 You walk to a coffee shop, right? I mean, there's [laughs] Right. Right. [laughs] There's, uh... [laughs] Like, you, you two are, you know [laughs] That's an upper last week in the show... 16:00 it's obviously [laughs] No, it's... My power went out, and we had to... I, I had to go to my sister's house to record the rest [laughs] of this episode Yeah. You're, you're not like- Yeah... 16:05 "Oh, well, I guess we're done here." One of the things... So I did, um, I did the Senate Intelligence Committee. 16:10 I was one of the outside researchers who led a team, um, studying the data sets that the platforms released, right? 16:16 So Alphabet and Meta and, um, Twitter at the time, X now, uh, turned over data sets of the Russian activity on their platforms that they identified to the Senate Intelligence Committee. 16:27 And the only company that showed us device, sort of more metadata-type information was, uh, Twitter. 16:35 But what you saw was at the time they were using these, uh, Russian, for example, Beeline, the char- uh, the carrier, Russian Beeline phones. By the time, you know... 16:44 And this was because nobody was looking for them, right? They were really operating very much in plain sight. Uh, the United States hadn't started paying real attention to this problem yet. What you saw though when... 16:54 You know, I, again, have stayed in this field for [laughs] some time since. Um, and what we see now is they're just not using their... They, they're not using Russian infrastructure. They want to not be found, right? 17:04 So the idea that they don't have other capacities, that there's not a very sophisticated infrastructure behind this, is very unrealistic. 17:13 Your average may be, you know, local, small, two-bit entity might be doing it that way, but a sophisticated... 17:19 You know, this idea that Occupy Democrats is saying, like, "Putin's trolls are done," like, no, that's just not true. I- is there, uh... 17:26 And, and that kind of brings me to my next question, which is that, like, is, is there [laughs] is there a version of this that works though where, like, you know, uh, there's a... We just... 17:33 There's a Death Star and, you know, we have... You fly to a specific part- [laughs]... and you, you kill that- Not at this point... do you know what I mean? [laughs] I, I, I really... 17:40 I mean, again, it's, it's very hard to know who's got what where. 17:43 Um, and one reason for that is that actually those of us on the outside now don't, um, meaning outside researchers, not, not, uh, integrity teams within companies, we don't have those same channels of communication open anymore. 17:55 We can talk about why that is. 17:56 Uh, but suffice it to say that the way that these operations have been analyzed for the better part of the last decade up until a year, about two years ago, um, was that we had signal that we would see, and they had signal that they would see, and we would sort of combine these different types of signal. 18:13 We could see at... I was at Stanford Internet Observatory, what you might call, like, kind of, um, horizontal. You could see, uh, all of a sudden, a message appearing on all, you know, 10 platforms at once, right? 18:24 What the platform could see was, like, depth. They could see a whole lot of deep information about the accounts that they had back-end information on, right? 18:32 Behaviors, log-ins, IP addresses, the stuff that's completely obscured to us but that they had. So these two things kind of together were often very useful. We could reach out and say, "Hey, we're seeing this thing." 18:44 For, I remember once, um, a Wagner Group started operating in Libya, and they were running these trolls pretending to be Libyan, and they were just very, um, you know, again, in that uncanny valley. 18:53 This is not what Libyan people talk about. This is not how Libyan people talk. So we reached out, and we said, "We see this. Do you see this?" 19:00 And, um, you know, and the platform said, uh, you know, "Give us a [laughs] give us a day. We'll have a look." And then they came back to us, and they were like, "Yes." 19:07 Um, and th- this was how those sorts of conversations went, right? Sometimes they would come back and say no. Sometimes they would send us stuff, and we would look at it and say, "I don't know. 19:15 These look like real people to us. Like, what, what made you make that decision?" So it's a very collaborative process. And of course, sometimes government would be in that process too. 19:23 For example, if the FBI had information about accounts that it could attribute through an operation or an investigation, which was something that neither of us, neither researchers nor platforms would have. 19:35 So these were the different pieces of the puzzle. 19:37 It, it sounds like there's a, in a, in a way that I find really intriguing and kind of nice in the AI world, there's, there's a human element to this, where you were talking about the vibes too, where a lot of it is just like, "Well, this doesn't feel right. 19:47 Let's investigate it." Is that, is that how a lot of this sort of begins? I wanna caution by saying that, um, the content is never enough on its own, right? You can't say, "Oh, here's a message. That message is weird. 19:58 It must not be American," right? 20:00 Because you do have people where, like, English isn't their first language, and so they will hit that uncanny valley of, uh, the speech just doesn't sound quite, you know, it's not fluent, not fluent American English, not fluent vernacular. 20:12 Um, you also see the, you know, um, political behaviors. 20:19 I remember everybody used to think that bots were happening when there would be a lot of repetitious, uh, you know, the sa- you'd see the same post over and over again. Copy-pasta is the term on Twitter. 20:29 Um, and then I remember once watching a Ted Cruz debate. I think he was debating Beto O'Rourke, right? And he had built an app. His campaign had built an app. 20:37 And when you hit the button, the, it would tweet the same thing. 20:40 So all of a sudden, it was like real Americans who were sitting there supporting Ted Cruz by hitting that button, but the behavior looked like, uh, you know, like an automated, um, sort of campaign of, of, of, like, stupid bots, dumb bots, uh, pushing out a bunch of crap, right? 20:55 So you do see this, you know, ways in which the content is not enough on its own. The behavior is not enough on its own, right? You don't wanna undermine your own credibility. 21:04 You don't wanna falsely accuse somebody, the variety of reasons why. But it was always a very, very collaborative process doing those attributions. 21:11 I made the Death Star joke, but w- there has been some policies put forth, you know, I think maybe five or six the last few years in the US of h- how here's how we could combat some of this, uh, the, these campaigns or interference. 21:22 Uh, to this point in time, they have all failed. In fact, I would almost argue it's kind of going the opposite direction. Why do you think that is? There's a couple reasons. So first, you know, adversar- the, the... 21:34 When I was describing that sort of playing field, right? 21:37 A new technology will often tilt towards the adversary because they will figure out how to use it, and the detector, right, the person responsible for stopping that operation, doesn't know that they're doing it yet, maybe isn't using the tech in the same way. 21:49 So you have to be innovative, thinking outside the box. But there is this, uh, kind of cat and mouse dynamic that is innately there as part of just the, um, adversarial behavior on the internet. 21:59 The other thing, though, is that there's no way to avoid saying it. The US government, um, retreated in very, very specific ways from doing this work in 2024. 22:11 Um, when the Trump administration came back to power, a lot of the entities that had been built to combat this during the first Trump administration, right? 22:19 The FBI's Foreign Influence Task Force, um, the State Department's Global Engagement Center, the, uh, DHS CISA, you know, these different organizations that, again, even within government, had different visibility and different capacity. 22:32 Uh, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence had a thing called the Foreign Malign Influence Center. 22:37 So all of these different facets of government worked in slightly different ways to investigate influence operations to respond or counter them. 22:45 Then, of course, you have what the military is doing, the things in the Pentagon, um, the term that the NSA uses is forward deployed defense, where they would actually go and launch attacks on internet research agency infrastructure to actually take down the trolls that were operating out of that building. 23:02 So they, there was a thing that the US government did. Forward deployed defense is the term. You saw it start back in 2018. Um, I believe that they talk about doing it now, right? But because of the, um, 23:16 the false narrative that the 2020 election was rigged and that these government agencies had been part of a Biden deep state that contributed to the rigging and stealing of the election, the people who worked there were punished by being fired, and the agencies were largely defunded. 23:31 You kind of almost described a, a Tom and Jerry, um, aspect of this, where, like, Jerry's always kind of got a step. Like, even if you advance the- [laughs] You know what I mean? Yeah, yeah. 23:40 Can you tell, uh, like, is there something to that, or is it better to, like, let's have some policies in place here or some actual bills that, that, that can, you know, uh, cr- help, to help to, or, or just agencies like you described to help to combat this? 23:53 So there's a couple different things there First, there's the agencies that combat this, and I do think that, um, in any... You know, the, the reality is this is table stakes now. 24:01 Like, we're talking about Russia in part because of the visibility of the Yandex story, but this happens everywhere. In every election, there is some sort of geopolitical dynamic. 24:10 Um, when I was at Stanford, I wrote about Egyptian operations, Saudi, Iran, Israel, United States, right? I wrote about the Pentagon running influence operations. I wrote about it recently, them targeting Latin America. 24:22 Um, Latin America, you know, Brazil, Mexico. The- It's just really it is very much everywhere at this point. So what that means is you can't overreact to it. 24:30 You can't think that that means that it is incredibly impactful and swaying elections left and right. 24:36 You also don't wanna do nothing because when you do nothing, you see the growth of the networks, the fake networks, the fake accounts, which is what we saw with the Internet Research Agency in 2016, where they had Instagram accounts with 500,000 followers, versus what you see now when platforms look at them and disrupt them, and they have maybe 50 followers, or they're just not getting any engagement. 24:57 So you do need to be proactive. And I mentioned the platforms also. Um, the platforms have no legal obligation in the United States to share that information, to do that work, right? 25:09 It's very much, um, a nice-to-have thing. There are different rules in Europe, but that question of, um, what should a platform be made to do is very complicated in the US because they do have... 25:22 You know, it is their First Amendment right to decide how to moderate, again, things that are not explicitly illegal. 25:28 Uh, this falls into the realm of political speech and propaganda, and that's where they have a lot of leeway to decide how they're going to handle it. 25:34 So it's actually public pressure and then ethics, uh, that kind of keeps it going. But unfortunately, they used to put these data sets out. We used to be able to see them, and now increasingly they don't do that. 25:45 Anything else you wanna share that, that, uh, people should know ahead of this election, or just generally when they think about, uh, Russian bots or everything that we talked about today? 25:52 [laughs] Really important to understand that the presence of what we call foreign malign activity does not mean that it is actually having an impact. Again, you have to think about it as table stakes. 26:03 They're gonna do it. Uh, you should not believe that every person who you don't like who [laughs] yells at you on the internet is a bot. Oftentimes, you know, there are many just, uh, [laughs] maladjusted people. 26:14 Um, so... [laughs] Sometimes the vibes are just bad, but they're- Sometimes the vibes are bad, exactly. [laughs] Yeah. 26:19 Um, so, no, I would say, you know, the internet didn't suddenly become nicer because Ukrainian drones destroyed Russian trolls, right? 26:26 People wanted that story to be true, uh, but wanting it to be true isn't the same as, as having the evidence that it actually is. Another great day in 2016. I have my ticket for Batman v Superman. 26:38 There is no way this movie is gonna be bad. [phone chimes] Hmm, a lot of accounts sure don't like Hillary Clinton. I don't have much time. I've come from the future to warn you about Russian election interference. 26:49 Also, Batman v Superman will be unfairly derided. Go back to the Russian thing. We'll find out that Russia carried out a social media campaign that favored Donald Trump, plus other efforts to fool American voters. 26:58 Well, surely American voters will be smart enough. You sweet, sweet idiot. No, stop! I had so many questions about Batman v Superman. Ah, 2020. I can't wait to not leave my house and anthropomorphize a can of Spam. 27:11 Things are definitely not gonna get weird. I'm gonna make some sourdough. Ah, it's the time-traveling twink from 2016. It's okay. I wrote that joke. We don't have much time. 27:20 I've come to warn you about Russian interference in the 2020 election. Again? We're gonna run this back a few times, actually. 27:25 Intelligence officials say Moscow continues to try to interfere in the 2020 campaign to help Trump, and Kremlin-linked figures are trying to boost Trump's candidacy on social. Sounds bad. 27:34 While you're here, do you wanna re-watch Batman v Superman? More than anything, but I don't have a well-paced two hours and 31 minutes. I could go back at any moment. No. 27:43 [sighs] Maybe I'll put googly eyes on the Spam can. Ah, another day in 2022. Time to watch House of the Dragon. There's no way this is gonna be too long and kinda boring. I don't have much time. 27:56 [gasps] My current associate producer, Chris Vazquez. That's Chris Prime. I'm future Chris, whose past appearances you've conveniently never mentioned. And that secret is slowly killing me. 28:04 Wait, is Russia doing more shady secret interference in the 2022 midterms? Actually, this time, this guy just kinda said it with his whole chest. Oh, well, that's anticlimactic. Just like House of the Dragon season two. 28:15 No. 2024 is so fun. It's Brat Dave summer, and Kamala Harris might run in the presidential election. 28:23 I work at the Washington Post, print media will never die, and I can't wait to watch The Late Show With Stephen Colbert tonight. Hey, I tried to warn you. About House of the Dragon season two, what a slog. 28:33 Yes, but almost as importantly, I warned you about Russian interference. 28:36 The Department of Justice said it disrupted foreign influence campaigns and accused two people of distributing content to US audiences while keeping the connection to Russia hidden. Hmm. That doesn't sound good. 28:47 What's worse, the Russians tried to be funny about it, and Merrick Garland was actually funny about it. He said, "I'm sure that was much funnier in the original Russian." Merrick Garland was funny? 28:56 We must be in the weird timeline. Last thing, I know she's blowing up right now, but never take a photo of Chappell Ro- No. Well, it's 2026. Time to stream Supergirl. Hey, I don't have much time. They're doing it again? 29:08 They're doing it again. Wanna watch Supergirl? Sure. Hey. With so much misinformation online, it's hard to know what's real or not, but one thing that is real is money, unless it's crypto or Bitcoin or Fartcoin. 29:23 Is that one real? It was real for me. I don't know, man. I'm trying to tell you about our sponsors, like Harry's, who support our show and make the Harry's Plus razor. 29:32 If you order using the link in our description, Harry's will mail you a Harry's Plus razor and cologne discovery set. 29:38 In addition to all the local news international members perks, you'll be the first to view these weekly episodes, plus get early access to the newsletter twice a week, quarterly stickers mailed directly to you, and a quarterly Zoom with me and the rest of the LNI team. 29:52 So, yes, the Ukraine attack did stop some significant bot traffic, but it's not as simple as saying that Zelenskyy's strikes are going to save the midterms. But if anyone can save us, it's him. 30:02 He can act, he can president, he can Paddington Bear voiceover. 30:06 Classic triple threat In fact, to actually stop foreign bot interference in our elections, we'll need to change the laws in our country, and that's proven to be tricky. 30:15 Because while there have been several proposals in Congress to address disinformation in election communications, none of these proposed bills have become law. Awesome. Congress is definitely not a dead institution. 30:26 [chime] And the fact that there's been no change means that social media election advertising remains essentially unregulated at the national level. Hell yeah. Alexei Not-a-Bot, you're back. Cake? Uh, I'm good. 30:40 David, I, uh, have confession. This cake you gave me, it inspired me. I am Russian bot. [dramatic music] What? I am not even Irish, and my last name is completely coincidence. Oh my God. I feel so foolish. 30:58 I bought you cake. I gave you my social security number like friends do. Yeah, independently of whole bot thing, you got to stop doing that. But David, you helped me see the light. I no longer want to be Russian spy. 31:13 I want to be normal American Gen Z teen. Cowabunga. [sighs] That's great, but I still feel so dumb. I couldn't even recognize a bot in my own house. What's a Dave to do? I have tips. 31:26 When it comes to the internet, approach emotionally-charged sensational content with a cautious lens. 31:32 Avoid getting election information from generative AI chatbots, and instead go to sources like election office websites. And as always, exercise responsibility when sharing political content that may be generated by AI. 31:47 And also, you have got to stop using your social security number as your password for everything. That's not a bot security thing, I'm just saying that as a friend. Can, can we be friends again, David? 32:01 I can't stay mad at you and your robot baby blues. [upbeat music] Groovy sauce, David. See you on the flip zone. Later, Alexei Not-a-Bot. Great guy. 32:11 So if major thought leaders all over the world and the internet can be tricked by bots and AI and misinformation, it can feel really, really hard to know how to move forward, but we still have to. 32:22 We may be living amongst the bots, and if the government isn't going to regulate them, the integrity of our information relies on us. 32:30 And if you have questions, you can call this, a real number, and leave a real voicemail, and I'll really try to answer it. Really. Bye bye. 32:38 [upbeat music]